The killing of history – John Pilger

John Pilger
Journalist, film-maker and author, John Pilger is one of two to win British journalism’s highest award twice. For his documentary films, he has won an Emmy and a British Academy Award, a BAFTA. Among numerous other awards, he has won a Royal Television Society Best Documentary Award. His epic 1979 Cambodia Year Zero is ranked by the British Film Institute as one of the ten most important documentaries of the 20th century.

One of the most hyped ‘events’ of American television, The Vietnam War, has started on the PBS network. The directors are Ken Burns and Lynn Novick.

Acclaimed for his documentaries on the Civil War, the Great Depression and the history of jazz, Burns says of his Vietnam films, “They will inspire our country to begin to talk and think about the Vietnam war in an entirely new way”.

In a society often bereft of historical memory and in thrall to the propaganda of its “exceptionalism”, Burns’ “entirely new”Vietnam war is presented as “epic, historic work”. Its lavish advertising campaign promotes its biggest backer, Bank of America, which in 1971 was burned down by students in Santa Barbara, California, as a symbol of the hated war in Vietnam.

Burns says he is grateful to “the entire Bank of America family” which “has long supported our country’s veterans”.  Bank of America was a corporate prop to an invasion that killed perhaps as many as four million Vietnamese and ravaged and poisoned a once bountiful land. More than 58,000 American soldiers were killed, and around the same number are estimated to have taken their own lives.

I watched the first episode in New York. It leaves you in no doubt of its intentions right from the start. The narrator says the war “was begun in good faith by decent people out of fateful misunderstandings, American overconfidence and Cold War misunderstandings”.

The dishonesty of this statement is not surprising. The cynical fabrication of “false flags” that led to the invasion of Vietnam is a matter of record – the Gulf of Tonkin “incident” in 1964, which Burns promotes as true, was just one. The lies litter a multitude of official documents, notably the Pentagon Papers, which the great whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg released in 1971.

There was no good faith. The faith was rotten and cancerous. For me – as it must be for many Americans – it is difficult to watch the film’s jumble of “red peril” maps, unexplained interviewees, ineptly cut archive and maudlin American battlefield sequences.

In the series’ press release in Britain – the BBC will show it – there is no mention of Vietnamese dead, only Americans. “We are all searching for some meaning in this terrible tragedy,” Novick is quoted as saying. How very post-modern.

All this will be familiar to those who have observed how the American media and popular culture behemoth has revised and served up the great crime of the second half of the twentieth century: from The Green Berets and The Deer Hunter to Rambo and, in so doing, has legitimized subsequent wars of aggression. The revisionism never stops and the blood never dries. The invader is pitied and purged of guilt, while “searching for some meaning in this terrible tragedy”. Cue Bob Dylan:“Oh, where have you been, my blue-eyed son?”

I thought about the “decency” and “good faith” when recalling my own first experiences as a young reporter in Vietnam: watching hypnotically as the skin fell off Napalmed peasant children like old parchment, and the ladders of bombs that left trees petrified and festooned with human flesh. General William Westmoreland, the American commander, referred to people as “termites”.

In the early 1970s, I went to Quang Ngai province, where in the village of My Lai, between 347 and 500 men, women and infants were murdered by American troops (Burns prefers the term “killings”). At the time, this was presented as an aberration: an “American tragedy” (Newsweek ).  In this one province, it was estimated that 50,000 people had been slaughtered during the era of American “free fire zones”. Mass homicide. This was not news.

To the north, in Quang Tri province, more bombs were dropped than in all of Germany during the Second World War. Since 1975, unexploded ordnance has caused more than 40,000 deaths in mostly “South Vietnam”, the country America claimed to “save” and, with France, conceived as a singularly imperial ruse.

The “meaning” of the Vietnam war is no different from the meaning of the genocidal campaign against the Native Americans, the colonial massacres in the Philippines, the atomic bombings of Japan, the leveling of every city in North Korea. The aim was described by Colonel Edward Lansdale, the famous CIA man on whom Graham Greene based his central character in The Quiet American.

Quoting Robert Taber’s The War of the Flea, Lansdale said, “There is only one means of defeating an insurgent people who will not surrender, and that is extermination. There is only one way to control a territory that harbours resistance, and that is to turn it into a desert.”

Nothing has changed. When Donald Trump addressed the United Nations on 19 September – a body established to spare humanity the “scourge of war” – he declared he was “ready, willing and able” to “totally destroy” North Korea and its 25 million people. His audience gasped, but Trump’s language was not unusual.

His rival for the presidency, Hillary Clinton, had boasted she was prepared to “totally obliterate” Iran, a nation of more than 80 million people. This is the American Way; only the euphemisms are missing now.

Returning to the US, I am struck by the silence and the absence of an opposition – on the streets, in journalism and the arts, as if dissent once tolerated in the “mainstream” has regressed to a dissidence: a metaphoric underground.

There is plenty of sound and fury at Trump the odious one, the “fascist”, but almost none at Trump the symptom and caricature of an enduring system of conquest and extremism.

Where are the ghosts of the great anti-war demonstrations that took over Washington in the 1970s? Where is the equivalent of the Freeze Movement that filled the streets of Manhattan in the 1980s, demanding that President Reagan withdraw battlefield nuclear weapons from Europe?

The sheer energy and moral persistence of these great movements largely succeeded; by 1987 Reagan had negotiated with Mikhail Gorbachev an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) that effectively ended the Cold War.

Today, according to secret Nato documents obtained by the German newspaper, Suddeutsche Zetung, this vital treaty is likely to be abandoned as “nuclear targeting planning is increased”. The German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel has warned against “repeating the worst mistakes of the Cold War … All the good treaties on disarmament and arms control from Gorbachev and Reagan are in acute peril. Europe is threatened again with becoming a military training ground for nuclear weapons. We must raise our voice against this.”

But not in America. The thousands who turned out for Senator Bernie Sanders’ “revolution” in last year’s presidential campaign are collectively mute on these dangers. That most of America’s violence across the world has been perpetrated not by Republicans, or mutants like Trump, but by liberal Democrats, remains a taboo.

Barack Obama provided the apotheosis, with seven simultaneous wars, a presidential record, including the destruction of Libya as a modern state. Obama’s overthrow of Ukraine’s elected government has had the desired effect: the massing of American-led Nato forces on Russia’s western borderland through which the Nazis invaded in 1941.

Obama’s “pivot to Asia” in 2011 signaled the transfer of the majority of America’s naval and air forces to Asia and the Pacific for no purpose other than to confront and provoke China. The Nobel Peace Laureate’s worldwide campaign of assassinations is arguably the most extensive campaign of terrorism since 9/11.

What is known in the US as “the left” has effectively allied with the darkest recesses of institutional power, notably the Pentagon and the CIA, to see off a peace deal between Trump and Vladimir Putin and to reinstate Russia as an enemy, on the basis of no evidence of its alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election.

The true scandal is the insidious assumption of power by sinister war-making vested interests for which no American voted.  The rapid ascendancy of the Pentagon and the surveillance agencies under Obama represented an historic shift of power in Washington. Daniel Ellsberg rightly called it a coup. The three generals running Trump are its witness.

All of this fails to penetrate those “liberal brains pickled in the formaldehyde of identity politics”, as Luciana Bohne noted memorably. Commodified and market-tested, “diversity” is the new liberal brand, not the class people serve regardless of their gender and skin color: not the responsibility of all to stop a barbaric war to end all wars.

“How did it f-cking come to this?” says Michael Moore in his Broadway show, Terms of My Surrender, a vaudeville for the disaffected set against a backdrop of Trump as Big Brother.

I admired Moore’s film, Roger & Me, about the economic and social devastation of his hometown of Flint, Michigan, and Sicko, his investigation into the corruption of healthcare in America.

The night I saw his show, his happy-clappy audience cheered his reassurance that “we are the majority!” and calls to “impeach Trump, a liar and a fascist!” His message seemed to be that had you held your nose and voted for Hillary Clinton, life would be predictable again.

He may be right. Instead of merely abusing the world, as Trump does, the Great Obliterator might have attacked Iran and lobbed missiles at Putin, whom she likened to Hitler: a peculiar profanity given the 27 million Russians who died in Hitler’s invasion.

“Listen up,” said Moore, “putting aside what our governments do, Americans are really loved by the world!”

There was a silence. – the films and journalism of John Pilger 



It’s not a gas – time for Europe to stand up to US hawks on Russia

Neil Clark is a journalist, writer, broadcaster and blogger. He has written for many newspapers and magazines in the UK and other countries including The Guardian, Morning Star, Daily and Sunday Express, Mail on Sunday, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, New Statesman, The Spectator, The Week, and The American Conservative. He is a regular pundit on RT and has also appeared on BBC TV and radio, Sky News, Press TV and the Voice of Russia. He is the co-founder of the Campaign For Public Ownership @PublicOwnership. His award winning blog can be found at He tweets on politics and world affairs @NeilClark66

Will the new tough sanctions package on Russia passed almost unanimously by Congress and awaiting the signature of President Trump be the straw that broke the camel’s back for the European Union?

The bill, which also targets Iran and North Korea, not only expands sanctions against Russia and potentially throws a massive spanner in the works of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline between Germany and Russia, but also seeks to limit the president’s ability to ease, or lift the sanctions in the future. The message from the neocon dominated Congress is clear: Russia must be kept in the ’sin-bin’(until of course a nice ‘liberal’ who will do everything the hawks in Washington demand comes to power), and economic/business links between Europe and Russia must be broken.

European leaders, many of whom would like to see sanctions on Russia eased have been quick to voice their disapproval. They know the huge cost to their economies the sanctions and Russian countermeasures have had, €4 billion to Italy alone, and further escalation of financial warfare with the Kremlin would be utterly disastrous.

Why should European companies and workers suffer because of the anti-Russian obsession of the American elites? Do we honestly think the US would impose sanctions on a country to its great economic detriment if European countries demanded it? You can literally bet your bottom dollar that they wouldn’t.

“I think the US sanctions are absolutely unacceptable. You can’t mix up political and economic interests, at the expense of European jobs,” was the angry verdict of Austria’s Chancellor Christian Kern.

‘‘Sanctions against Russia should not become a tool of industrial policy in US interests,” said Martin Schaefer, spokesman for the German Foreign Ministry.

“America First cannot mean that Europe’s interests come last,”declared EU President, Jean-Claude Juncker.

Alas, that’s what’s been happening for some time now – and Donald Trump has nothing to do with it.

The sad truth is that since the era of strong, independently-minded leaders such as Charles de Gaulle, Olof Palme, and Bruno Kreisky, Europe HAS subordinated its interests to that of the US and lobbies operating in the US.

Take the 2012 EU sanctions on Iran. At first, Europe resisted pressure from the US (and the pro-Israel lobby), to impose an oil embargo on Tehran over an unproven nuclear weapons program. They eventually succumbed – to great cost to EU member states such as Greece, Spain, and Italy who benefited from the importation of cheaper Iranian oil.

So often in recent years, Europeans have been left picking up the tab for neocon policies.

Consider the refugee crisis. This has been caused in large part due to US-led ‘wars of intervention’ in the Middle East and elsewhere. The vast majority of refugees heading to Europe are coming from countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Syria, which have either been attacked or invaded by the US or where Washington has backed proxy forces to topple the governments. Of course, imperialistic European countries, under craven ’Atlanticist’ leadership, have played a key role in these conflicts too, with Britain particularly culpable and France too, in regards to the destruction of Libya.

While some European countries, like Germany, have opened their doors quite widely to refugees fleeing the war zones the US has lagged some way behind.

“The US accepts far fewer Syrian refugees than other Western countries,” notes the Guardian.

Now lawmakers on Capitol Hill want to hit European pockets even harder. Congress is clearly out to sabotage the Nord Stream-2 pipeline, with its proposal the US would be able to sanction any company which was involved in the maintenance or development of Russia’s energy export pipelines.

“This bill, if it comes into force, would allow measures against European natural or juridical persons for situations that have no connection with the United States,” declared a statement from the French Foreign Ministry.

Of course, that’s utterly outrageous. But again it’s not without precedent. In 1996 Congress passed the Iran and Libyan Sanctions Act, giving the US the right to impose economic sanctions on firms doing business with those two countries. The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 also penalized foreign companies that did business in Cuba, by preventing them doing business in the US.

It’s not enough the US sanctions countries it doesn’t like, everyone else has to join in too. Or else.

Apologists for 21st-century imperialism would call this “fighting for democracy and human rights.” Straight-talkers would call it what it is: bullying.

We only have to follow the money trail to see who benefits from all of this. If European-Russian energy projects are scuppered, US gas companies, offering more expensive liquefied natural gas, would be the big winners.

Back in June, the first US natural gas was shipped to Poland. “The United States is in a position to start aggressively marketing gas exports to Europe because of its “”fracking revolution,”…After decades of consuming nearly all of the energy it produced, the United States is now expected to become the world’s third-largest exporter of gas by 2020,”enthuses the CIA-seed funded, RFE/RL.

This desire, to dominate Europe’s energy market, and the childish desire of hawks in Congress to get Donald Trump to ‘prove’ he is not a ‘Russian agent’ by signing a bill that will kill off any hopes of better relations between Washington and Moscow, is the background to the new sanctions legislation.

If Europe doesn’t oppose it forcefully, then it’s effectively signing up to its own assisted suicide. Moscow has already said it doesn’t rule out any measures ‘to bring the US to its senses’- and as a first step has ordered the US to reduce its embassy staff in Moscow to 455 people (from about 1,100) and to stop using storage facilities.

Do EU leaders want to join in with foaming-at-the-mouth US neocons and ’liberal hawks’ in their fanatical crusade against Russia? Again, if war does break out, as some seem to want, it’ll be Europe that takes the biggest hit, and not the US.

It’s not hard to find historical parallels. The subservient EU relationship to Washington in recent decades can be compared to the ’Dual Monarchy’ of Austria-Hungary which officially came into being in 1867. While Vienna and Budapest had ’equal’ status, it was clear who called the shots – literally. When Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo in June 1914, it was the Hungarians who urged caution. Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Istvan Tisza, was opposed to any military assault on Serbia without prior diplomatic action and opposed giving Belgrade a list of demands that would be impossible to fulfill. In the end, he capitulated – and the Great War started.

“Tisza resisted for a fortnight,” notes historian Peter Hanak. “In spite of this though, Austrian and German politicians, together with the military, finally convinced him that the time was now ripe for the Central Powers to go to war. Any delay would only serve the interests of the Entente-made up of the ‘enemies’: France, Britain, and Russia.”

The result was a catastrophe not just for Hungary, which lost around two-thirds of its territory, but the whole of Europe. And, in October 1918, Tisza, the man who had caved-in to external pressure, against his own country’s best interests, was shot dead after angry soldiers and workers broke into his house.

As in 1914, Europe is now at a critical point in its history. Will its leaders ‘do a Tisza’ and surrender to the war-hawks, or will they resist the pressure to agree- or acquiesce- to an anti-Russian, anti-European policy which they know is not in their countries’ interests? The next few weeks will tell us all.

Twitter @NeilClark66

Eurasia in the War of Networks | ALEXANDER DUGIN

by Akira Zentradi

The reason for writing this text was Vladimir Putin’s address to Russia’s Federal Assembly and the synchronized passage of the anti-Russian resolution 758 by the U.S. Congress. Commenting on the latter, Congressman Eliot Engel stated: “It’s time to recognize the fact that Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin is a threat to European security and to U.S. interests in the region[1].” Back in 2011, Hillary Clinton similarly proclaimed: “We are in an information war.”[2] In his address, Putin stated: “Crimea, the ancient Korsun or Chersonesus, and Sevastopol have invaluable civilizational and even sacral importance for Russia, like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the followers of Islam and Judaism. And this is how we will always consider it.”[3]  In other words, he declared a tough course for the revival of Russia’s sovereignty and continental power, as well as its sacred Orthodox identity. In response, the United States openly mentioned its information war against Russia:

(20) [The House of Representatives] calls on the President and the United States Department of  State to develop a strategy for multilateral coordination to produce or otherwise procure and distribute news and information in the Russian language to countries with significant Russian-speaking populations which maximizes the use of existing platforms for content delivery such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Incorporated, leverages indigenous public-private partnerships for content production, and seeks in-kind contributions from regional state governments;

(21) calls on the United States Department of State to identify positions at key diplomatic posts in Europe to evaluate the political, economic, and cultural influence of Russia and Russian state-sponsored media and to coordinate with host governments on appropriate responses; [4]

In reality, they have been carrying out this war against us for quite some time. But now it has reached a new level.

Parallel to these developments, I have noticed an increase in direct attacks against Eurasianists and me, personally, as well as the broad network of those interacting with me in Russia and around the world in the recent months. The last straw was the hacked e-mail box of a member of the Eurasian Movement, which was followed by a flurry of publications in the Western mainstream media about the alleged Russian-agent network around the world. These supposed agents were referred to as the “Black International” for the purpose of discreditation. I believe that the time has come to make some clarifications and, at the same time, identify the next trajectory for our Eurasian strategy.

Eurasianism as an anti-Western ideology

Let me remind you of the pre-history.

From the moment of its inception in the 1920s, Eurasianism has always opposed the global domination of the West, European universalism, and supported the uniqueness of the Russian civilization. Therefore, Eurasianism is, indeed, an anti-Western ideology in the sense that it rejects the Western society’s right to impose its criteria of good and evil as the universal norm. Russia is an independent Orthodox-Eurasian civilization, rather than the periphery of Europe, insisted Eurasianists, following their ideological predecessors, the Slavophiles, along with other Russian conservatives.

Gradually, Eurasianism was enriched with the methods of classic geopolitics that were based upon the dualism of the Land and Sea civilizations. Englishman Halford Mackinder introduced this concept in the first half of the twentieth century; it was further developed by American strategists such as Nicholas Spykman and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Here, Russia serves as the core of the Land civilization, Eurasia’s Heartland, and is thus doomed to carry out a centuries-old battle against the Anglo-Saxon world. In the past, its core was the British Empire, and, from the second half of the twentieth century onward, this was the United States. Therefore, Eurasianists oppose Western hegemony, American expansionism, and Liberal values and support the distinct Russian civilization, religion, and tradition. Furthermore, Eurasianists not only oppose the West, but also Russia’s own Westernizers and moderates: Liberals, first and foremost.

If the Atlanticist West is the enemy of the Eurasianists, then the Eurasians are the enemies of the West and its agents of influence. This is logical. Eurasianists know who their enemy is, and whom they oppose, and the enemy knows who the Eurasianists are. In this case, it would be strange if the Atlanticists, U.S. imperialists, and Liberals loved the Eurasianists and their supporters around the world. And vice versa. Hence the obvious thesis: we are either on the side of the Land civilization or that of the Sea. Land stands for Tradition, Faith (for Russians, this is Orthodox Christianity), Empire, narod (peoples), the Sacred, History, Family, Ethics. The Sea is modernization, trade, technology, Liberal democracy, capitalism, parliamentarism, individualism, materialism, and gender politics.  These two are mutually exclusive sets of values.

Neo-Eurasianism in the Post-Soviet Period

A group of neo-Eurasianists, led by me, has been restoring and developing all these ideas as a comprehensive worldview starting from the late 1980s. We have reestablished a significant portion of the ideological heritage left by the original Eurasianists, added geopolitics and Traditionalism, and applied them to the political realities of the rapidly disintegrating USSR. Like the first Eurasianists of the 1920s—writing in emigration—we supported the transformation of the USSR into the Eurasian Empire. These transformations were supposed to involve preserving the entire space under unified strategic leadership, but changing the ideology to Orthodoxy and Eurasianism. And just like the original Eurasianists, we were convinced that the Liberals and Westernizers are the worst enemy of the Russian idea (worse than Communists), and that they would tear Greater Russia (USSR) apart if they were to be in power.  After all, they were part of the Atlanticist network. This was fully confirmed in due time: they did get into power and did destroy it. And then they tried to break up the Russian Federation. Therefore, Eurasianists stood in radical opposition to Yeltsin and the entire Liberal-democratic pro-Western puppet regime of the 1990s, which was dominated by the comprador bourgeoisie and Russophobic agents of the U.S. This period marks the first demonization of neo-Eurasianists—the patriotic opposition in Russia—as “Russian chauvinists” in the United States and the West.  Western ideologues even dragged a number of patriotic leaders into this anti-Eurasianist hysteria by using their ignorance and vanity and, occasionally, by simply bribing them.

All that changed by the year 2000 when Putin came to power. He began to transform the Yeltsin system in the patriotic vein, embodying a significant portion of ideas directly within the principles and values of the Eurasianist ideology. This and only this is the reason why the Eurasianists have supported Putin and support him still. There is nothing personal here: we opposed Yeltsin, an Atlanticist-Westernizer, and began to support patriotic Putin. This is a purely ideological, crystal clear choice. This is also the reason why the degree of hatred toward Eurasianists among Russia’s Liberal Westernizers along with the U.S.-dominated West had increased dramatically.

Today, Putin’s policies are increasingly moving along the lines of Eurasianist ideas. This is why the West along with Russia’s Liberal media and Liberals within the government that pragmatically support Putin have begun to carry out a direct attack against Eurasianists.  They view the danger of Eurasianist support for Putin not in their number or influence, but in the sheer power of Eurasianist ideas, based on geopolitics and the civilisational method, accurate historic analysis and a radically anti-Western, anti-Liberal orientation, leaving no room for manipulation, fraud, and deception for the Westernizers. For this reason, thorough effort has been put into ensuring that Putin would not offer the slightest support for the Eurasianists. According to the architects of Atlanticism, this would lead, sooner or later, to marginalised Eurasianism, pushing its ideology out into the periphery. This required colossal effort for the West and Russian Liberals. We cannot say that we successfully overcame all their efforts, but the opposite is also obvious: Putin confidently marches toward the establishment of the Eurasian Union. He does not fear openly challenging the West and its Liberal values, loudly addressing Faith, Tradition, and the conservative foundations of society.

Eurasian Networks Abroad

Already in the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, Eurasianists began to create a vast and extensive network relying on those forces that also rejected Atlanticism and American hegemony, opposed Liberalism and gender politics—those who stood for Tradition, the sacred, Christianity and other traditional faiths. Most often, the Eurasianist network has tended to include conservatives that are normally referred to as “right-wing.” Quite often, however, there opponents of American hegemony were found on the “Left” as well. Some of them were Russophiles, whereas others gravitated toward Eurasianism for pragmatic reasons: Russia’s traditional society was stronger than that of the West, and Russia’s strategic potential could become the counterweight to American domination. Many in Europe and beyond its borders studied geopolitics and easily identified the proponents of the Land civilization—to which they subscribed themselves (representing Tradition versus Liberalism)—in Eurasianism. However, the Eurasianist network was incomparably weaker and narrower than the enormous Atlanticist counterpart, supported by global capital (for instance, George Soros), pro-American Liberal elite (which almost always is the ruling class), military and intelligence power of the U.S. and NATO, an ever-expanding segment of youth attached to the Western network, forming a cosmopolitan view of things, individualism, overcoming morality, and a complete break with religion, traditions, narod(peoples), family, and even biological sex (gender). Nevertheless, the Eurasian network has been developing on the basis of those forces that disagreed with the new form of global domination—the “third totalitarianism” that rejects the rights of all other ideologies, if they do not recognize the basic principles of Liberalism. Any anti-Liberal alternative “on the Left” was classified as a “Stalinism” and “GULAG,” whereas those “on the Right” were called “Nazi” and “Auschwitz.” Eurasianism was neither Communist nor Fascist, that is, neither “Right” nor “Left.” This is why Liberals have dubbed it the “Red-Brown International.” Depending on the circumstances, they could declare Eurasianism to be “a network of KGB agents” (“Stalinism”) or the “Black International” (“Eurasianist Fascism”). No one cared about the fact that it was neither one nor the other: for Liberals, there is no truth outside Liberalism. This explains the systematic and deliberate campaign by the Western mainstream media that had begun in the 1990s in order to systematically discredit Eurasianism and Eurasianists.

Gradually, the influence of Eurasianism and Eurasianist networks grew outside of Russia (in Europe, Turkey, and the former Soviet Union—especially Crimea and the eastern territories of the former Ukraine), and within Russia itself. Putin’s response to the coup in Kiev—reunification with Crimea and the start of liberating Novorossia—served as a telling moment demonstrating the steadily growing significance of Eurasianism, often gone unnoticed by the surface-based observer. I described these scenarios as inevitable as early as the 1990s (See A. Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki [Foundations of Geopolitics] Moscow, 1997). Back then, I explained them through historical inevitability and geopolitical necessity: according to the logic of Eurasianist geopolitics, Ukraine will either join the Atlanticists (then the east and south will secede) or Russia (then the western regions will revolt).  This is precisely what happened, and Putin acted as a true Russian patriot and Eurasianist under difficult circumstances rather than a Liberal and Atlanticist. As a result, the official West along with Russian Liberals and their veiled accomplices initiated a new wave of persecutions against Eurasianists, who were accused of endless and, at times, completely absurd claims, and blamed for all the deadly sins. The stronger these ideas became and the clearer was their embodiment in real political acts, the more hatred they aroused among the representatives of the Sea civilization and its network.

Network against Network

At the very beginning of the Ukrainian drama, I nominally divided Russia’s Atlanticists into the “fifth” and “sixth” columns. The “fifth” column represents overt Atlanticists, Liberals, and supporters of U.S. politics, who oppose Putin and Russian patriotism. The so-called “sixth” column disguises itself as pragmatists and state bureaucrats, supporting Putin on the outside. Like the “fifth” column, however, they categorically reject Eurasianist ideas and attempt to either restrain or sabotage any of Putin’s patriotic endeavors, dealing a blow to the Eurasianist network both in Russia and abroad. In Ukraine, the Maidan was an Atlanticist initiative. Crimea became the first Eurasianist answer to the Maidan. Novorossia would have been the second Eurasianist answer, but here, our offensive has (thus far) been contained by the Atlanticists in Russia and beyond. Much has changed during the course of the dramatic events in Ukraine in 2014. But Eurasianist geopolitics remains unchanged: Russia’s strategy involves sovereignty, multipolarity, and complete independence from American domination. Putin speaks and acts upon this notion. Therefore, despite everything, Eurasianists fully support Putin and his course. Again, this is nothing personal. At any given moment, certain aspects of his policy can generate small or great degrees of enthusiasm, while others—no enthusiasm at all. In general, however, a large segment of time measured in decades will reveal the fact that it is Eurasianist politics to which Putin subscribes. And it is obvious that he will adhere to this course later on. His latest address to the Federal Assembly leaves no doubt about this. It was impossible not to understand this from his speech. Openly declaring the Eurasianist platform, Putin stated:

If for some European countries national pride is a long-forgotten concept and sovereignty is too much of a luxury, true sovereignty for Russia is absolutely necessary for survival. Primarily, we should realize this as a nation. I would like to emphasize this: either we remain a sovereign nation, or we dissolve without a trace and lose our identity. Of course, other countries need to understand this, too. [5]

In terms of the Ukrainian situation, Eurasianist networks in Europe demonstrated their full potential. Almost all the pro-Russian protests, election observers, and even the French volunteers in Novorossia were somehow connected to the Eurasianist networks or to closely related or parallel movements. This is quite natural. In Europe and other places, Eurasianists are well aware of geopolitics, grasping the fact that this is not a conflict between two Slavic nations, Russia and Ukraine, but the Land versus Sea, American hegemony and unipolarity against the multipolar world represented by Russia. Therefore, the Eurasianist network does not act in the interests of Russia, but rather, the interests of Europe and the idea of multipolarity. Again, this is nothing personal: there are those who agree with Liberalism and American agenda and those who disagree. Europe’s conservatives do not agree with being dominated by the U.S. Consequently, they turn their gaze toward a place that offers a possible alternative. And what do they see? Putin’s Russia and the Eurasianist ideology. And they understand one through the other, regardless of the starting point.

This logic is obvious to friends, but it is also evident to enemies. Putin is enemy number one for today’s Liberal West and the Sea civilization, because he consistently defends the interests of the Land counterpart. Any successful leader making Russia great and independent would be a “villain” in the eyes of the West, no matter who he really is. Therefore, Putin simply cannot become a hero for the U.S. and global Atlanticism. To do so, he would have to destroy Russia, as Gorbachev did with the USSR, for which he was applauded.

The same applies to Eurasianism: no matter the ideology, if it defies America’s hegemony, while relying on a powerful nuclear state, it cannot be indifferent or viewed in an abstractly neutral manner. Enemies understand everything very well and will use every effort to demonize Eurasianism by any means necessary. They employ denigration, defamation, slander, insults, false labeling, misidentification with “Stalinism” or “Fascism” (depending on the particular context) bought trials, and so on.

Under Attack. Preparing a Counteroffensive  

At some point, Putin, as the leader of a great country, and the Eurasianist ideology, as a conceptual apparatus that accurately describes the challenges and goals of the current geopolitical situation— where old ideologies (Left and Right) no longer work—fused into a shared object of all-encompassing hatred in the eyes of the entire Atlanticist network. Anyone who supports Russia or even criticizes the West simultaneously becomes “Putin’s agent”, “Russian spy,” and a “Eurasianist.” At the same time, it is worth noting that when we mention the so-called fifth column in Russia and the network of Atlanticist agents, we are instantly bombarded with accusation of paranoia and conspiracy theories.

But look at the mainstream-media headlines in the West: the search for “Putin’s fifth column” is in full swing, there are lists of “Russian spies,” and there is a direct campaign to identify all those who are sympathetic toward Russia on the basis of a hacked Eurasianist email. What is our small heroic network of those who oppose today’s Liberal world order in comparison to the trillions of the Federal Reserve System, Liberal universities, the latest technology, global mainstream media, as well as the tens of thousands NGOs and agents of influence within the European and Asian elites? But this network inspires rage and fury in the enemy. After all, Russia is with us. And Putin leads Russia. Our people and history stand behind him. No longer does a handful of enthusiasts carrying Novorossia’s flags and Putin’s portraits on the streets of Europe seem so pathetic. This is the alternative civilization—that of the Land, of the Heartland—arising from slumber. And it will continue to arise until fully awakened.

This is a calm before the storm. The situation in Novorossia has reached a dead end. Pressure on Russia is growing by the minute. We are under a powerful onslaught. Anyone who actively supports Putin, links up with the Eurasian network, and defies the American Beast, is currently under attack. Under heavy fire. This fire grows. Pressure becomes increasingly strong. Betrayal is particularly unpleasant in this situation. It is unfortunate when the enemy is well aware of how dangerous you are to him, whereas your potential friend seems to be unaware of your usefulness. Herein lies the real test. One can endure it only through a powerful idea. Despite psychological tricks and complex network games that our opponents use to strangle us.

We have established and will continue establishing Eurasianist networks throughout the world. We have worked and will continue working against American hegemony in order to undermine it. We have supported and will continue supporting all alternative players in Europe and Asia that stand for Tradition (for us, Russians, this is Orthodox Christianity, first and foremost), justice, freedom, and a multipolar world. Despite the aspirations of today’s West: there is not one, but many civilizations; there is not one (Liberal), but many ideologies; there is not a single humanity, but a rich diversity of cultures that do not accept globalization and will fight it to the bitter end.



Alexander Dugin

Professor of the Moscow State University, Doctor of political sciences, founder of the contemporary Russian school of Geopolitics, leader of the International Social Movement “Eurasian Movement“, Moscow, Russian Federation.

§ 1 Multipolarism as a Vision of the Future and Land in the Postmodern Era

Multipolarism as an Innovative Mold-Breaking Concept

The Multipolar Theory represents a unique direction that cannot be qualified simply in terms of “progress/conservatism”, “old/new”, “development/stagnation”, etc. The unipolar and globalist view on history imagines the historical process as a linear motion from the worse to the better, from the underdeveloped to the developed, and so on and so forth. In this case, globalization is seen as the horizon of a universal future, and everything that impedes globalization is simply seen as the inertia of the past, atavism, or a striving to blindly preserve the “status quo” at all costs. In virtue of such a percept, globalism and “The Sea Power” are also trying to interpret Multipolarism as exclusively being a conservative position opposing the “inevitable change”. If globalization is the Postmodern (the global society), Multipolarism appears to be resistance to the Postmodern (containing elements of the Modern and even Pre-Modern).

Alas, it is indeed possible to consider things under a different visual angle and set aside the dogmatics of linear progress[1] or the “monotonous process”[2].  The idea of time as a sociological category of the philosophy of Multipolarism is based on interpreting the general paradigm of Multipolarism through the view of an absolutely different system.

Multipolarism, in comparison with unipolarity and globalism, is not just an appeal to the old or a call for preserving everything as it is. Multipolarism does not insist either on preserving national states (the Westphalian world) or on restoring the bipolar model (the Yalta world), nor on freezing that transitional state where international life is currently positioned. Multipolarism is a look into the future (that which has not yet been), a project of organization of the world order on absolutely new principles and elements, and thus, a serious revision of the ideological, philosophical, and sociological axioms that modernity rests upon.

Multipolarism, as well as unipolarity and globalization, is oriented towards the construction of that which has never been before it, to the creative strain of free spirit, the philosophical search and the striving for building a better, more absolute, fair, harmonious, and happy society. What is different, however, is that the character of this society, its principles and values, and also the methods to construct its foundation, are seen in a radically different way when compared to the globalists’ vision. Multipolarism sees the future to be multiple, full of variety, differentiated, dissimilar, and preserving a wide palette of collective and individual self-identification choices. There are also undertones of frontier societies that experience the influence of different identification matrices. This is a model of the “flourishing complexity” of the world, where a multitude of places combines with a multitude of times, where multiscale collective and individual actors engage in a dialogue, and thus figuring out and sometimes transforming their identity in the course of such a conversation. The West’s culture, philosophy, policy, economy, and technology are seen in this future world to be just one of many local phenomena, in no way excelling the culture, philosophy, policy, economy, and technology of the Asiatic societies and even the archaic tribes. All that we deal with in the form of different ethnoses, peoples, nations, and civilizations are equitablevariations of “human societies” (“Menschliche Gesellschaft”[3]). Some of them are “disenchanted” (M. Weber) and materially developed, while others are poor and plain, though still “enchanted” (M. Eliade), sacred, and living in harmony and equilibrium with their ambient existence. Multipolarism accepts whichever choice society makes, but any choice becomes sensible only in the context of space and a historical moment, and hence, it remains local. The most that Western culture, perceived as something local, can do for others is be a source of admiration and arouse delight, but a claim for universalism and separation from the historical context turns it into a simulacrum, into a Quasi-West, into a cartoon and kitsch. To some extent, this has already happened in regards to American culture’s influence over Europe, where it is still easy to recognize Europe, but this Europe is hypertrophic, sterilized, and deprived of internal harmony and proportions, charm, and tradition. It is a Europe of the universalist project and it is no longer organic, taking on the characteristics of a complex, paradoxical, dramatic, tragic, and contradictory historical and spatial phenomenon.

Multipolarism as the Postmodern

If we refer to the past, we will easily find out that the Multipolar World, the international order based upon the principle of Multipolarism, never existed. Multipolarism is therefore a project, plan, and strategy of the future, not a mere inertia or sluggish resistance to globalization. Multipolarism observes the future, but sees it in a radically different way than the proponents of unipolarity, universalism, and globalization do, and it strives to bring its vision into life.

These considerations demonstrate that, in a certain sense, Multipolarism is also the Postmodern (not the Modern or Premodern), but simply different from the Postmodern visions of globalism and unipolarity. In this special sense, the Multipolar Philosophy agrees that the present world order, and also that of the past (national or bipolar), is imperfect and demands a radical alteration. The Multipolar World is not an assertion of K. Schmitt’s Second or Third Nomos of the Earth, but a battle for the Fourth Nomos that must come in place of the present and the past. As well, Multipolarism is not rejection of the Postmodern, but the establishment of a radically different Postmodern than the version suggested by the globalists and proponents of the unipolar world; different in relation to the neo-liberal dominating version, and in relation to the critical antiglobalist and alterglobalist position, it will be based upon the same universalism as neo-liberalism, but only with the reverse sign. The Multipolar Postmodern therefore represents something altogether different from the Modern or Pre-Modern, neo-liberal globalism or unipolar America-centric imperialism, or leftist antiglobalist or alterglobalist ideas. Therefore, in the case of the formalization of Multipolarism into a systemized ideology, the conversation drifts precisely to “The Fourth Political Theory”.

The Multipolar Idea recognizes that national states do not correspond with the challenges of history, and moreover, they are merely a preparatory stage for globalization. Therefore, it supports integration processes in specific regions, insisting so that their borders consider the civilizational peculiarities of the societies historically developed in these territories. This is a positive feature of postmodernism.

The Multipolar Idea posits that the significance of new non-state actors must increase in international politics, but these actors must be, first of all, original historically developed organic societies (such as ethnoses) having an established relationship to their space of activity. This is also a postmodernist feature.

The Multipolar Idea rejects the universal “Great Narratives” (stories), European logocentrism, rigid power hierarchies, and an assumable normative patriarchate. Instead of this, it supports the value of local, multifaceted, and asymmetrical identities reflecting the spirit of each specific culture, whatever it is and however alien and execrable it seems to the rest. This is yet another postmodernist feature.

The Multipolar Idea rejects the mechanistic approach to reality and the Descartes division into the subject and the object. It does this by affirming integrity, holism, and an integral approach to the world, one that is organic and balanced, based rather upon the “geometry of nature” (B. Mandelbrot) than on the “geometry of the machine”. This yields ecologism for the Multipolar World, rejection of the “subjugation of nature” concept (F. Bacon), and transition to “a dialogue with nature”. This is an even better postmodern feature. 

The Multipolar Postmodern against the Unipolar (Globalist/Antiglobalist) Postmodern

When the conversation drifts to the measure of things in the future world, serious contradictions begin to arise between the Multipolar Theory and Postmodernism. Liberal and Neo-Marxist Postmodernism operate with the basic concepts of the “individual” and linear “progress”, conceived in the prospect of the “liberation of the individual” and, on the last stage, in the prospect of “liberation from the individual” and a transition to the post-man, be it a cyborg, mutant, rhizome, or clone. Moreover, it is the principle of individuality that they consider universal. Here, the Multipolar Idea sharply diverges with the main line of Postmodernism and posits the society[4], collective personality, collective consciousness (E. Durkheim), and the collective unconscious (K. G. Jung) as the center of things. Society is a matrix of existence; it creates individuals, people, languages, cultures, economies, political systems, time, and space. In the Multipolar Idea, there is not just one society, as societies are many, and they are all incommensurable with one other. An individual has become “the measure of things” in such an absolute and accomplished form only in one type of society (Western European), and in all other societies, he has not and will not become so. This is because they are structured in an absolutely different way. One must acknowledge the inalienable right for each society to be such as it wants to be and to create reality by its own means, be it through assigning an individual and man a superior value or not assigning them any.

The same idea concerns the issue of “progress”. Since time is a social phenomenon[5], it is structured in a different way in each society. In some societies, it bears in itself an increase in the role of the individual in history, while in others it does not. Therefore, there is no determining factor across societies concerning the concepts of individualism and post-humanity. The fate of the West will likely continue to proceed towards these aforementioned directions, as this path is connected with the logic of its history. The West’s embrace of individualism and post-humanity has the potential to inflict collateral damage to other societies and nations, as even if these ideas are already somewhat present in their culture, it is as a rule usually in the form of externally enforced colonial precepts that are align paradigms for the local societies themselves. It is this colonial imperialist universalism of the West that is the main challenge for the Multipolar Idea.

By using the terms of geopolitics, it can be said that Multipolarism is the land, continental, tellurocratic version of the Postmodern, whereas globalism (as well as antiglobalism) is its sea and thalassocratic version.

§ 2 Multipolarism and Globalization Theories 

Multipolarism against the Global Policy

From the position of Multipolarism, let us now consider the basic theories of globalization and how they relate to one another.

The World Polity Theory (J. Meyer, J. Boli, etc.) presumes the creation of an integrated global state, and with the support of individual citizens, it is maximally opposite to Multipolarism and represents its formal antithesis. It is similar to the theses of “the end of history” (rapid or gradual) by F. Fukuyama and all the other rigidly globalist unipolar projects that describe a desirable and probable future that completely contradicts the Multipolar one. In this case, between Multipolarism and the theory of globalization, there exists a relation of plus and minus, black and white, etc. As an example, there is a radical antagonism of ultimatums: either “The World Polity” or Multipolarism. 

Multipolarism and the Global Culture (in Defense of Localization)

The case study of relations is more difficult to conduct with the World Culture Theory (R. Robertson) and “transformationists” concepts (E. Giddens, etc.). Critical appraisals of globalization in the spirit of S. Huntington can also be referred to here. In these theories, they analyze the balance of two trends – universalization (pure globalism) and localization (R. Robertson) – or the new appearance of civilization contours (S. Huntington). If the attitude of the Multipolar Theory to universalization is unambiguously antagonistic, a number of phenomena that manifest themselves as secondary effects in the course of globalization can, on the contrary, be appraised positively. The weakening of the sociopolitical context of national states in these theories is demonstrated from two sides: partially, their functions are transferred to global entities, and partially, they turn out to be in the hands of some new, local actors. On the other hand, due to the fragility and looseness of national states, civilizational and religious factors assume ever greater importance. It is this set of phenomena that accompany globalization, and they are consequences of the weakening of previous state and ideological world models that deserve positive attention and become elements of the Multipolar Theory.

The secondary effects of globalization return societies to a specific spatial, cultural, and occasionally, religious context. This leads to the reinforcement of the role of ethnic identity, an increase in the importance of the confessional factor, and increased attention to local communities and problems. In summarizing these phenomena, they can be realized as strategic positions of the Multipolar World Order that must be fixed, fastened, and supported. Within the “glocalization” described by Robertson, Multipolarism is interested in “localization”, being in complete solidarity with it. Robertson himself believes that the processes of “glocalization” are not predetermined and can sway to one side or another. Accepting this analysis, the supporters of the Multipolar World must consciously apply their efforts so that the processes sway to the “local” side and overweigh the “global” one.

Multipolar Conclusions from the Analysis of the World-System Theory

The World-System Theory by I. Wallerstein is interesting for the Multipolar Theory due to the fact that it adequately describes the economic, political, and sociological algorithm of globalization. Wallerstein’s “World System” represents the global capitalist elite as huddling around “The Core”, even if its representatives come from the “periphery” countries. “The world proletariat” that gradually transits from a national identity to a class-based (international) one personifies the “periphery” not just geographically, but also socially. National states are no more than sites where one and the same mechanical process takes place. This is the enrichment of oligarchs and their integration in the supranational (global) “Core” and the pauperization of the masses, which gradually interfuse with the working class of other nations in the course of migration processes.

From the point of view of the Multipolar Theory, this analysis does not consider geopolitics or the cultural and civilizational factor. The latter is the disregard for the topic inherent in Marxism as a whole, which is first of all focused on the disclosure of the economic mechanics of society’s organization. In the present world, “The Second World” (i.e. regional integration formations or “Great Spaces”) is situated between “The Core” and “the Periphery”. Under I. Wallerstein’s logic, their existence changes nothing in the general structure of the world-system, and they merely represent a step in the direction of complete globalization – the integration of the elites in “The Core” and the “internationalization of the masses” occur more rapidly here than in the context of national states. But under the logic of the Multipolar Theory, the presence of “The Second World” radically changes it all. Between the elites and masses existing in the various integration structures within the limits of “The Second World”, there can arise a model of relations other than the liberal or Marxist analysis forecast. S. Huntington called it “modernization without Westernization”[6]. The essence of this phenomenon is that, while obtaining a Western education and mastering Western technologies, the elites of the periphery countries often act in the following way: they do not integrate into the global elite, but instead return to their society, confirm their socialization and collective identity within it, and put their mastered skills to service for their own countries, thereby not following the West, and even opposing it. The factor of cultural identity (often religion) and civilizational affiliation turns out to be stronger than the universalist algorithm presented in the technology of modernization and the very medium that begot it.

The process of societies’ stratification and the elite’s Westernization as described by Wallerstein definitely takes place, but a different process may also take place – “modernization without Westernization”. Together with regional integration without global integration, these processes represent a tendency which I. Wallerstein himself ignores, but which his analysis ironically allows one to be able to clearly see and describe. This becomes a very important element and program thesis for the Multipolar Theory.

As for the global horizon, all societies now have to confront most of the theories of globalization firsthand, and the Multipolar Theory can propose the following principles.

The true completeness and integrity of the world is objectively real, but it can only be properly perceived once one removes the surrounding banality which obscures his pure understanding of it. Heidegger called this the “authentic existing of Dasein”[7]. Grasping the world as a whole can be only possible through the modification of existence, not through the accumulation of ever new data, expressions, meetings, conversations, information, and knowledge. According to Heidegger, man is spurred on to study new places and landscapes in order to escape from genuine existence, and this concept is personified in the figure of Das Man, i.e. an impersonal and abstract, yet concrete, living form that finds various substitutes to replace the true experience of existing. Das Man, having an inauthentic existence, dissolves the concentration of his own consciousness through “curiosity” and “gossip”, two of the various forms non-authentic existence[8]. The simpler that communications in the global world are, the more senseless they become. The more saturated the information flows are, the less people are able to reason and decode their meaning. Therefore, globalization in no way contributes to one acquiring experience of the whole world, but on the contrary, misleads from it by dispersing the attention in an infinite series of meaningless puzzles where the parts are not attributes of the unified whole, i.e. they exist as unrelated fragments of existence. The global horizon is not reached in globalization – it is comprehended in a profound existential experience of a place.

Therefore, different societies do not collide in the global horizon, but with the challenge of globalism as an ideology and practice that attacks every society and challenges all local communities, they could find a common ground in rejecting the enemy that menaces all peoples and cultures without discrimination. The Multipolar Theory recognizes the universalism of this challenge, but holds that it must be repulsed just as universally in order to stave off a forthcoming catastrophe, disaster, or tragedy.

The horizon of globalism is conceived as something that must be defeated, overcome, and abolished. Each society will do it in its own way, but the Multipolar Theory suggests generalizing, consolidating, and coordinating all the forms of opposition to the globalization challenge. As global as the challenge of globalization is, so too must be its rejection, but the structure of this rejection, so as to be full-fledged, independent, and prospective, must be multipolar and suggest a clear and distinct project of what should be put in place of globalization.

§ 3 From a Poison to a Cure 

Saddling the Tiger of Globalization: the Multipolar Network 

The construction of the Multipolar World demands the developing of a special attitude to all basic aspects of the globalization process. We have seen that although Multipolarism opposes unipolarity and globalization, the question is not simply about the rejection of all the transformations that surround modernity, but about selecting the multipolar format for these transformations, to influence them, and to guide the process to the pattern seen as being the most desirable and optimal. Therefore, Multipolarism in certain situations is not so much meant to directly oppose globalization as it is to recapture the initiative and allow the processes to go along a new trajectory, thereby turning “a poison into a cure” (“to saddle the tiger”[9], to use a traditional Chinese expression). Such a strategy repeats the logic of “modernization without Westernization”, but on a more generalized and systemized level. Some separate societies in a regional culture borrow Western technologies so as to reinforce themselves and repulse the pressure of the West at certain times. Multipolarism suggests comprehending such a strategy as a system that can serve as a general algorithm for most different non-Western societies.

Let us give some examples of such a reinterpretation of separate aspects of globalism through the multipolar perspective.

Let us take the network and network space phenomenon. By itself, this phenomenon is not neutral. It represents the result of a series of gradual transformations in the sociological understanding of space in the context of “The Sea Power” on the path of ever greater information medium dilution – from the sea through the air to the infosphere. Along with it, the network represents a structure that perceives the presence of relations between the system elements not in the organic, but in the mechanic, way. The network can be constructed between separate individual elements that initially are not connect with each other and have no common collective identity. As it evolves, the network phenomenon presents the prospect of overcoming humanity and entering into the post-human age. This is because the centrality of man becomes ever more and more relative (N. Luhmann, M. Castells, etc.) in the very functioning of self-organizing systems like the network. From this point of view, the network represents a reality that is cardinally “Sea”, Atlantist, and globalist.

In classical geopolitics, we can see that the positions of the Land and Sea are connected not so much by the presence of one element or another, but with the sociological, cultural, philosophical, and only then, strategic conclusions different societies make from their contact with the Sea. K. Schmitt emphasizes[10] that in spite of creating a global empire based upon navigation, Spanish society continued preserving its strictly land-based identity, which also particularly manifested itself in the social organization of the colonies and in the difference between the future destinies of Latin and Anglo-Saxon America. The presence of developed navigation does not necessarily make a power a sea one in the geopolitical sense of this term. Moreover, the objective of the Land Power and, in particular, of the Heartland, is to obtain access to the seas, break the financial blockade on the part of the thalassocracy, and begin to compete with it in its own element.

The situation with the network space is the same. The Multipolar camp needs to master the structure of the network processes and their technologies, learn the rules and regularities of network behavior, and then gain a possibility to realize its objectives and goals in this new element. The network space opens new possibilities for smaller actors: after all, the locations of a huge planetary level transnational corporation, a great power, or an individual minimally mastering programming skills are in no way different from each other, and in a certain sense, they appear to occur in similar conditions. The same can be said for social networks and blogs. Globalization banks that code diffusion into a multitude of network participants will one way or another install them in a context, whose basic parameters will be controlled by owners of physical servers, domain name registrars, providers, and hardware monopolists. But in the antiglobalist theories by Negri and Hardt, we have seen how leftist-anarchist theorists suggest coopting this circumstance for their interests while preparing a “rebellion of multitudes” that is called for to overthrow the control of the “empire”[11].  Something analogical can also be suggested in the Multipolar prospect, but the question is not about conducting a chaotic sabotage of the globalists plans through the use of the “multitudes”, but about constructing virtual network civilizations tied to a specific historical and geographical place and possessing a common cultural code. A virtual civilization can be considered a projection of the civilization as such in the network medium, assuming that the lines of force and the identification perceptions that are dominant in a corresponding cultural medium are consolidated there. This is already used by different religious, ethnic, and political forces that are in no way globalist or even antiglobalist, and they coordinate their activities and propagate their views and ideas with the help of different instruments of the Internet Network.

National domains and the development of network communications in local language systems are another form. With effective operation in this medium, this can contribute to the reinforcement of the youth’s cultural identity, as they are naturally predisposed to the allure of new technologies.

The example of the “Chinese Internet” (where access is legally and physical limited) can, according to the opinion of some Chinese governmental experts, damage the security of Chinese society. On the reverse, in the political, social, and moral fields, this example demonstrates that purely restrictive measures can also exercise some positive effect for the reinforcement of Multipolarism.

The global network can turn into a multipolar one, namely, into an aggregate of intersecting but independent “virtual continents”. Thus, instead of the singular network, there will appear many networks, each being a virtual expression of a specific qualitative space. All together, these continents can be integrated in a common multipolar network, differentiated and moderated on the grounds of the multipolar network paradigm.  Eventually, the content of what is in the network will be a reflection of human imagination structures[12]. If actualizing these structures in a multipolar way (i.e. as those just making sense in a specific qualitative historical space), it is not difficult to imagine what the Internet (or its future analogue) could be in the Multipolar World.

On a practical level, under the present conditions, a network can already be considered as a means of consolidating active social groups, personalities, and societies under the aegis of promoting Multipolarism, i.e. gradual multipolar network construction. 

Network Wars of the Multipolar World

Network wars are one more phenomenon of the globalization period. One should also be armed with the methodology of network wars – both in the common theoretical and application aspects – in constructing the Multipolar World. In this sense, the Network-centric Principle adapted during the reorganization of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation represents an absolutely justified decision, addressed to reinforce the Heartland’s positions and increase the performance of the army that constitutes one of the main elements in the multipolar configuration.

The Network-centric Principle of warfare has some technical and principal aspects to it. The equipping of separate units of the Russian Army with network attributes (tracking devices, operative two-way communication devices, interactive technical means, etc.) is a self-evident side of the issue, demanding no special geopolitical grounds. What is much more important is in considering another more common aspect of network warfare.

A network war, as it appears from its theorists’ actions, is constantly waged in all directions – against enemies, allies, and neutral forces. In the same way, network operations must be evolved in all directions and on the part of the center (or some centers) for the Multipolar World construction to succeed. If we assume that the actor pursuing a network war is not a state, but a non-state entity targeting the creation of the Multipolar World (like those that the US network war targets in order to establish the unipolar world), we will see that waging this war by different poles (e.g. Russia, China, India, Iran, etc.) will create interference and resonances and multiply the reinforcement and effectiveness of network strategies. By constructing the Multipolar World, each pole is interested in reinforcing the other poles, but also in weakening the hyperpower’s global hegemony. Thus, a network war waged by the Multipolar World can represent a spontaneous convergence of effort with structural ramifications that can be extremely effective. The reinforcement of China is beneficial for Russia, just as the security of Iran is beneficial for India. The independence of Pakistan from the US will positively redound upon the situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia, among other places.

By directing networks, information, and image flows that are associated with the multipolar idea in each and every direction, a network war can become extremely effective, as the securing of the interests of one Multipolar World actor automatically furthers the interests of another. In this case, coordination must only occur on the highest level – on the level of the countries’ representatives in the multipolar club (as a rule, these are heads of states) where the common multipolar paradigm will be exactly coordinated. Network war processes will bring this common strategy into life.

The second important part of the Network-centric War theory is in emphasizing the increased sensibility to initial conditions. These initial factors that affect the end result are the point in which the possible conflict starts, the position that other participating countries take up, and the information medium that broadcasts the conflict’s developments. Therefore, higher priority attention should be paid to preparing the medium – the local and global one. If the correlation of forces, a computation of the consequences of the various steps taken in the information field, and the preliminary preparation of image presentation are made correctly, this can make a conflict situation impossible by persuading a potential opponent of the hopelessness of resistance or armed escalation. This concerns traditional warfare as well as information wars, where the fight is waged for influence upon public opinion.

Therefore, the countries declaring their orientation to Multipolarism can and must actively use the theories and practices of network-centric operations for their interests. The theorists of network wars fairly consider them to be a crucial strategic instrument of waging a war in the Postmodernist conditions. Multipolarism undertakes the challenge of the Postmodern and begins a battle for its direction. Network-centric operations represent one of the most important territories to wage this battle.

Multipolarism and the Dialectics of Chaos

Another example where a strategy of turning “a poison into a cure” can be found is in the chaos phenomenon. Chaos ever more frequently figures into modern geopolitical texts[13], as well as in globalization theories.  Proponents of the rigid unipolar approach (such as S. Mann[14]) suggest manipulating chaos in favor of “The Core” (i.e., the US). Antiglobalists and postmodernists welcome chaos in its literal sense – as anarchy and disorder. Other authors try to see buds of order in the chaotic reality.

The Multipolar Approach treats the problem of chaos as follows:

First, the mythological concept of “chaos” as a condition opposing “order” is predominantly a product of Greek (i.e. European) culture. This opposition is initially based upon the exclusiveness of order, and subsequently, as philosophy develops and order is identified with rationality, chaos has entirely turned into a purely negative concept, a synonym of irrationality, darkness, and inanity. It is also possible to approach this problem in another way, however, in a less exclusivist sense, and then chaos will discover itself to us as an entity not opposing order, but instead preceding its strained logical expression. Chaos is not nonsense, but a matrix from where sense is begotten[15].

In Western European culture, chaos is an unambiguous “evil”, but this is not the case in other cultures. Multipolarism refuses to consider Western European culture as being universal, and hence, chaos itself loses its unambiguous negative image, and the order correlated with it attains a positive image. Multipolarism does not reason in terms of chaos or order, but it demands explanations every time – what chaos and what order, and in what sense does a specific culture hold one or another term? We approximately know how chaos and order are comprehended by Western culture, but how does the Chinese one comprehend it, for example? Indeed, the idea of “Tao” that is crucial for Chinese philosophy (“The Way”) is described in many texts in terms that strikingly remind one of the descriptions of chaos. Therefore, the multipolar approach states that the understanding of chaos and order is relative to civilizations, and the Western conception is not universal by any means.

Firstly, globalists often understand “chaos” in the geopolitical sense as being anything that does not correlate with their perceptions of ordered sociopolitical and economic structures and that counters the establishment of their subjective global and “universal” values. In this case, everything that is valuable for the construction of the Multipolar World, including the insistence on other forms of identity, consequently bears within itself the seeds of the Multipolar Order and thus falls within the class of “chaos”. Per this example, “chaos” supports the construction of the Multipolar World and is its life-bearing origin.

Finally, chaos, in the manner that it is understood as being pure disorder or weakly organized spontaneous processes taking place in a society, can also be considered from the position of Multipolarism. Whenever a chaotic situation (conflict, disturbance, collision, etc.) arises in a natural or artificial way, it is necessary to learn to control it, i.e. master the art of chaos moderation. Being against ordered structures by their vey nature, chaotic processes do not lend themselves to a straightforward logic, but it does not mean they do not have it at all. Chaos does have logic, but it is more complex and comprehensive than the algorithms of non-chaotic processes. At the same time, it lends itself to scientific research and it is actively studied by modern physicists and mathematicians. From the point of view of geopolitical application, it can well become one of the most effective instruments for constructing the Multipolar World.

[1] Alain de Benoist. Protiv liberalizma. SPb, 2009.

[2] Dugin A. Protiv modernizacii// Odnako, 2010. №10 (26).

[3] Thurnwald R. Die menschliche Gesellschaft in ihren ethno-soziologischen Grundlagen, 5 B. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1931-1934.

[4] Dugin A. The sociology of the imaginary. The introduction into the structural sociology. M., 2010

[5] Ibid.

[6] Huntington Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

[7] Dugin A. Martin Heidegger and philosopgiya drugogo nachala. M., 2010.

[8] Heidegger called globalism with the term “Planeter Idiotism” having in mind the original Greek meaning of the word idioteς that implies a polis inhabitant deprived of civil identity, i.e., of affiliation to a phyle, caste, trade, cult, etc. SeeDugin A. Martin Heidegger and philosopgiya drugogo nachala. Op. cit.

[9] Evola J. Cavalcare la tigre. R, 2001.

[10] Schmitt С. Die planetarische Spannung zwischen Ost und West (1959)/Schmittiana – III von prof. Piet Tommissen. Brussel, 1991.

[11] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, 2000..

[12] Dugin A. The sociology of the imaginary. The introduction into the structural sociology. M., 2010.

[13] Ramonet I. Géo-politique du chaos. Paris: Galilée, 1997; Idem. Guerres du xxie siècle – Peurs et menaces nouvelles. Paris: Galilée, 2002.

[14] Mann St. R. Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought//Parameters. 1992. Autumn. № 55.

[15] Dugin A. Martin Heidegger and the possibilty of the Russian Philosophy. Op. cit.


Stolen Kosovo: the Czech Documentary

Although the Czech Television (Česká televize) was one of the sponsors of the documentary, it delayed broadcasting it several times, claiming the documentary was “unbalanced” and marked with “pro-Serbian bias”, and so “the tone of the documentary could cause negative emotions.”   Václav Dvořák, the director, responded that the same could be said for “Holocaust documentaries, where the Nazi Germany ‘side’ and ‘views’ are also appropriately ignored”.

The documentary producer, Aleš Bednář, additionally stated the film-makers don’t rule out that some viewers could feel it was “unbalanced”, but only because they had been “lopsidedly informed about Balkan conflicts through years, above all by television, but by other media as well.”

Its first broadcasting, scheduled for 17 March 2008, on the 4th anniversary of the ethnic clashes in Kosovo in 2004, was postponed until April, and was eventually broadcaste with a follow-up show analyzing the Kosovo conflict from the point of view of the Kosovo Albanians.  The creators of the documentary published it on YouTube, where it is still available (as of September 2015).

Western Media – Brief history of Anti Russian propaganda


Nikolai Gorshkov


The latest spate of allegations by western media and politicians about Russian propaganda is nothing new. The UK Cabinet files from 1980-s just released by National Archives in London reveal the British establishment’s obsession with a propaganda war against Moscow.

Ministers were worried over “the confused state of British public opinion (America seen as a great a threat to peace as Russia)” and “a strong strain of anti-Reagan and anti-American sentiment”. They put this down to “Soviet propaganda” and the gullibility of the British public.

A number of memos to Prime Minister Thatcher recommended countering this with support for pro-government groups in the UK as well as expanded radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union and its “satellites” to “project” western culture and wean the countries of Eastern and Central Europe off their alliance with Moscow.

But the story of anti-Russian propaganda goes far back than last century.

‘Contempt for the Russian People’

Over 460 years ago an English navigator Richard Chancellor arrived in Moscow via the Russian port of Archangel on the White Sea. He was entertained by Tsar Ivan the Terrible who granted freedom of trade to English merchants, looking for a direct route to China to bypass the monopoly of Venice. Despite this hospitality, the English almost immediately formed a view of Russia as a “barbaric” country.

Anthony Cross, Emeritus Professor at the Department of Slavonic Studies, University of Cambridge is the editor of ‘A People Passing Rude: British Responses to Russian Culture’.

“Among the earliest and most influential Elizabethan accounts of Russia were those collected and published by Richard Hakluyt in two editions at the end of the 16th century, but two other publications, appearing before Hakluyt but then included by him in emasculated form, were influential in establishing a largely negative perception of Russia that extended way beyond intense cold and ubiquitous bears to religious obscurantism, tyrannical rule, and almost willful ignorance.”

Professor Cross took the title for his book from an epistle by the English poet George Turbervile, secretary to Thomas Randolph during his embassy to Muscovy in 1568, who entertained London society with damning depictions of “a people passing rude to vices vile inclin’d.”

In a much more scholarly ‘Of the Russe Commonwealth’ treatise another English Ambassador Giles Fletcher (1588-9) described Russians as ignorant and godless.

The famous author of “Paradise Lost” (and “Regained”) poet John Milton also had a jab at the Russians. In his ‘Brief History of Muscovia’, a compilation of 16th century accounts, published posthumously in 1682  he echoed Fletcher in suggesting that the Russians ‘have no learning, nor will suffer it to be among them’.

Milton claimed his book was based on witness accounts.

But as an American researcher of Muscovia John B Gleason observed:

“No one seems to have asked whether the eyewitnesses were truthfull, well-informed, conscientious. The Muscovia never raises such questions but uses every kind of assertion indiscriminately.”

Another expert on the subject Lloyd E Berry has identified “two ‘thematic’ similarities between Giles Fletcher’s and Milton’s books on Russia:  “pride in the accomplishments of the English people and [their] system of government” and “contempt for the Russian people” and “Russian institutions.”

Russian Spies at the Palace

This western contempt for Russia and its people manifested itself during the Crimean War of 1853-56.

Russia had been putting military pressure on the Ottoman Empire in an effort to force political concessions from Turkey, particularly in regard to the governance of Orthodox Christian populations of the Balkan lands under Ottoman rule. Russia expected support from the Christian rulers of Britain, France, Prussia, and Austria, but both Catholics and Protestants of Western Europe viewed Muslim Turks as a lesser evil than Orthodox Russians.

In a Punch parody of an Orthodox Christian icon, the Tsar is seated on cannon balls, with a ramrod as a crozier, a mortar as a mitre, and a halo of bayonets.

That the Balkan peoples who rebelled against the Ottomans saw Russia as their protector and liberator made London, Paris and Vienna worry more about geopolitics than national aspirations of the oppressed.

It was England, particularly the Home Secretary Lord Palmerston, and the British press, led by The Times and the satirical magazine Punch who pushed hardest for the western powers to declare war on Russia. Such was the war fever brought about by the press that rumours abounded about Queen Victoria’s husband, Prince Albert, being a Russian agent. Thousands waited by the Tower of London to see Prince Albert escorted into the infamous prison.

The Bear Season

In a reference to Aesop’s fable about bees defending their hive from an intruding bear a Punch cartoon shows Turkish, Austrian, Prussian, French, and English ‘bees’, protecting the ‘hives’ of Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, against the angry Russian ‘bear’.

The first depictions of Russia as a fearsome beast appeared in the 16th century Poland who was trying to establish its influence over its “less European” brethren. But it was the English who mastered the art almost to perfection. The first ever allegory of Russia as a bear appeared on a series of English engravings ‘The European Race’ started in 1737.

The Punch, established in 1841 made this allegory a household item. From then on the fearsome beast has been invoked each time the West wanted to depict Russia as a savage country.

Even the infamously bungled charge of the Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava was used by The Times to belittle the Russians as compared to the English:

“If the exhibition of the most brilliant valor, of the excess of courage, and of a daring which would have reflected luster on the best days of chivalry can afford full consolation for the disaster of today, we can have no reason to regret the melancholy loss which we sustained in a contest with a savage and barbarian enemy.”

The British were equally disdainful towards their Turkish allies whom London purported to “save” from the Russian “bear.”

Varying Degrees of Ignorance

In 1921, after the end of the Russian Civil War and military intervention by Britain, the United States and a dozen other western countries, a group of American journalists went to Moscow. Their task was to report on the changes happening in Soviet Russia. The Soviet government lent them rooms at the Savoy Hotel free of charge. Much later, in a book by an American journalist Whitman Basso ‘The Moscow Correspondents: Reporting on Russia from the Revolution to Glasnost’ they reminisced about the challenges they faced.

They admitted they did not know the language, the history, the politics, or very much about the men who shaped the momentous events. Among the inhabitants of the Savoy Hotel there were no Soviet experts, nor even, as British journalist Paul Winterton later put it, people with “varying degrees of ignorance.” What little they knew about Soviet Russia they probably learned from their own newspapers.

British journalists appeared to be a lot more knowledgeable than their American colleagues at the time but many used their knowledge of Russia in a peculiar way.

In 1924, the Daily Mail published a forgery that threw Anglo-Russian relations off-course for a long time. The Daily Mail made the most of a fake letter allegedly written by the head of Comintern Zinoviev to the British Communists, calling it “Moscow’s orders to our Reds.” Following the publication of the forged letter London reversed its decision taken earlier that year to recognize Soviet Russia and cancelled a treaty with Moscow that was meant to move the East-West relations from confrontation to cooperation.

It could be argued that it was this letter and not Churchill’s Fulton speech 22 years later that laid the foundations of the Cold War. It is not widely known that Churchill borrowed his famous — or infamous — reference to the ‘Iron Curtain’ from no other than the ace of Nazi propaganda Goebbels who had used the metaphor to justify war on communism.

The relay was swiftly picked up by the American press. “Every Communist is Moscow’s Spy” was the battle cry of Senator McCarthy’s ‘Un-American Activities Committee’ in the 1950s.

Even Hollywood wartime films about the anti-Nazi alliance with Moscow, commissioned by the White House, were declared pro-Soviet propaganda. The Russian bear leaped from the British onto of the American pages. In time for the Olympic Games in Moscow the top-selling Rider’s Digest magazine called on the Americans to “Stand Up to the Russian Bear.”

The US athletes boycotted the Games, but the rest of the world saw a different kind of bear — a huggable Olympic mascot Misha The Bear who shed a tear of sorrow at the Moscow Olympiad’s closing ceremony.

Since then Russia has shed its communist past but the West does not appear to be ready to drop its propaganda war.

Summing it up in 2014 Roger Cockrell wrote in Slavonic and East European Review:

“Time and again we are reminded of the ambiguities in British attitudes towards Russia and Russian culture, covering the spectrum from extravagant praise to profound distrust, and embracing purely negative traits such as ignorance, fear, stereotyping and condescension. How many would argue that such reactions and attitudes belong simply to the past?”

Two years on such attitudes are stronger than ever…

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